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THE ROLE OF WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST ECONOMIC CRIME 
 
There is a story told of a bank in London, which, as required under the Money 
Laundering Regulations, held a training course for its staff in the anti- money laundering 
precautions that were to be taken and also some of the signs that indicate a potential 
money launderer.  About a week later, a junior cashier, who had taken part in the course, 
came to the Manager to say that she wished to report her suspicion that the money in a 
certain customer’s account came from drugs trafficking.  The Manager thanked her for 
her diligence, but assured her that this particular gentleman was an established and 
respectable customer and certainly not a drug dealer or money launderer.  She replied, 
“But I want to make a report of my suspicion that he’s laundering drug money.”  Again 
the Manager assured her that such a report was not necessary: this customer was well-
known to the bank and was certainly not a criminal.  She then went to the Money 
Laundering Reporting Officer and a similar conversation ensued.  Eventually, just to stop 
her going on, the Money Laundering Reporting Officer wearily took a formal report from 
her and then himself made a report to the National Criminal Intelligence Service.  But he 
maintained to the girl that it was all unnecessary. 
 
What followed can be guessed.  The report led to a police investigation into the man in 
question and further evidence was soon uncovered that he was indeed involved in drug 
trafficking.  He was arrested and duly prosecuted and jailed.  Everyone, however, was 
embarrassed.  The police were embarrassed that they had not uncovered the evidence 
earlier and the bank was extremely embarrassed that they had tried so hard to persuade 
the girl not to make a report.  But all was well that ended well.  The police held a small 
reception for the girl to commend her for her perception and her determination to do the 
right thing.  As the reception was ending, the officer in charge of the case casually asked 
her what it was that made her so sure that this customer was a drugs trafficker.  “Oh,” she 
said, “that’s simple.  He’s the man I buy my Ecstasy from when I go out clubbing.” 
 
Whether or not the story is true, it makes two important points.  Firstly, the key to 
uncovering economic crime and bringing the perpetrators to justice is often one 
individual, indeed, quite possibly one who has definite inside knowledge.  But secondly, 
the system does not always welcome that individual speaking about what they know and 
may go to great lengths to stop them from doing so.  The whistleblower is indeed of 
paramount importance in the fight against economic crime – yet at the same time, they 
are often in far from a strong position.  Indeed, they may not only be weak, but actually 
vulnerable.  In order to establish how to counter this problem, this paper considers first 
who the whistleblowers actually are, then the pressures which can be applied to them and 
finally, what measures can be put in place to protect them. 
 
 
Who are the whistleblowers? 
 
Frequently, the crime concerning which a person wishes to blow their whistle is actually 
committed inside their organisation, perhaps by a senior officer.  This of course applies to 
all crime, but it is perhaps particularly true of economic crime.  It of course applies to 
those who have been knowingly and deliberately involved in a criminal organisation: the 
pentito in Sicily or the “tout” in Northern Ireland.1  But it applies equally to those who 
work in a legitimate company or institution, in which a small minority, possibly only one 
person, is engaged in economic crime: often fraud, sometimes money laundering or 
insider dealing. 
 
Almost exactly five months ago, I took part in a forum on economic crime held at Cass 
Business School in London, at which several Metropolitan Police officers were also 
present.  One of the points which emerged was that, when internal fraud, ie. fraud 
committed against an institution by one of its own officers or employees, was discovered, 
it invariably transpired that several of the fraudster’s colleagues knew what had been 
going on and had often known for quite some time.  On reflection, this should not be 
surprising, for two reasons.  Firstly, those who work closely with a person will soon 
notice if their behaviour changes for any reason.  But secondly, the staff of a financial 
institution are trained to know how legitimate business should be done and hence will 
know when things stray outside this.  It may be helpful to look at these in turn. 
 
In a financial institution, colleagues work closely together and get to know each other 
well.  This is, of course, true of many types of business, but it is perhaps particularly true 
of a financial institution where hours are often long and people work together as a team, 
whether on a new project, putting together a product for client or managing an investment 
portfolio.  They will get to know the patterns of behaviour, not only colleagues but 
secretaries will first be dealt with on first name terms and then often become friends.  
They will socialise together, in some countries going out drinking on a Thursday or 
Friday night, talking not only about work but about the football, their partner or family, 
their plans for the weekend.  Through all this, they become well known to each other at 
not only a professional but also a personal level. 
 
Then, through working together, their habits become known to each other.  Who comes 
into the office at 6.55 am every morning and who is there at 6.30?  Who goes out on a 
Thursday night and who carries on working?  Who flirts with the female staff and who 
does not?  Who dictates letters, memos and e-mails to their secretary and who tends to 
write them him or herself?  All of these things form patterns.  Should these patterns 
change, the person’s colleagues will therefore be the first to notice.  Why is it, a secretary 
will wonder, that her boss, who always used to dictate all his correspondence to her, is 
now writing a lot of it himself?  Why is it, colleagues will wonder, that, despite the fact 
that no major project is ongoing, that a person remains in the office every night after 
everyone else in his department has left?  This may be explained by the fact that this 
person is a particularly hard worker, but colleagues will know if this is the case.  If it is a 
recent change in behaviour, others will notice. 
 
                                                 
1 Organised economic crime is not confined to “traditional” criminal organizations, ie. those whose 
principal aim is to make money: no more, no less.  It is now well documented that it is also perpetrated on a 
regular basis by terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda or the Provisional IRA. 
A final point to be made in relation to changes in patterns is a change in lifestyle.  
Lifestyle choices cost money and this money has to come from somewhere.  If, just after 
large bonuses have been awarded, a person in a bank goes more often to expensive wine 
bars and orders bottles of champagne rather than beers or ordinary wine, this is nothing 
unusual: most of his colleagues will be doing likewise.  The same applies to other large 
spending: a new, expensive car or a larger and better house.  Similarly, a given level of 
expenditure can be explained by a large salary: the financial services sector is among the 
best paid in the economy.  But colleagues will know what they all earn (at least 
approximately) and they will also know what bonuses have been awarded when.  If what 
a colleague is officially earning and the lifestyle he is leading simply do not match up, at 
least some will wonder where the rest has come from.  It is no wonder that in many 
jurisdictions, a major anti-corruption tool is a provision requiring any public official to 
explain, if asked, where sums in his bank account and / or those which he appears to be 
spending have come from. 
 
In addition to this awareness of changes in patterns, which all may notice, there is the 
additional training that staff in financial institutions have in what does and does not 
naturally fit with legitimate business.  This applies not just to banks but to investment 
firms, insurance companies, firms of accountants and so forth.  Some of this training is 
formal.  As seen above in the United Kingdom, as in many jurisdictions, all staff in 
financial institutions (and, now, a number of other sectors as well) are trained in the 
factors that may indicate money laundering.  There are also fraud awareness 
programmes: in the United Kingdom, both the Metropolitan and the City of London 
police forces assist financial institutions in running such courses to assist staff in 
identifying factors which can indicate fraud, whether internal or external.  But in addition 
to these, there is the informal training that comes simply from experience.  Not only will 
staff learn what the normal patterns of a given colleague’s behaviour are, they will also 
learn over time what the normal ways of doing business are.  In a case involving a small 
to medium sized company in the U.K., a member of staff, whom we shall call Alan, said 
that among the things which made him suspect that a senior colleague, Bill, was engaging 
in fraud was that, although Bill, like most of the staff, had been issued with a computer 
by the company, he always seemed to use his private laptop instead.  Why, Alan wanted 
to know.  It just did not make sense.   
 
Thus far, we have considered whistleblowers who are members of staff of the same 
company as the fraudster, money launderer or whatever  But a further category is also of 
prime importance: the auditor or accountant.  In the U.K., the Companies Act 1985 
requires the accounts of all publicly listed companies (PLCs) to be reviewed annually by 
external auditors and those of private limited liability companies to be similarly reviewed 
by a chartered accountant.  Many other countries have similar requirements.  The purpose 
of these provisions is to ensure that any failures in governance, incompetence as well as 
outright criminal behaviour, may be identified by a person who does not have a vested 
interest in it remaining undisclosed.  Such persons are even more highly trained than the 
average financial services professional in what are the characteristics of legitimate 
behaviour and what are not.  They are therefore extremely well-placed to notice if 
anything is amiss; as just discussed, that is their very function.  It is true that, sometimes, 
duplicate sets of accounts can be prepared for the auditor or accountant, a genuine one 
disclosing the actual position and a fictitious one giving an illusory picture of the 
company, intended to deceive the auditor along with everyone else.  But generally, the 
auditors / accountants are aware of the real position.  Indeed, where they do not disclose 
fraud, it transpires all too frequently that they have colluded, at least in its concealment, 
rather than been deceived themselves.  The tale of Enron and Arthur Andersen is a case 
in point. 
 
 
What are the pressures on whistleblowers to remain silent? 
 
These, then, are the main types of potential whistleblowers.  But the fact that a person 
knows that criminal activity is going on does not necessarily mean that they report it.  
There are a range of pressures which can be brought to bear in order to persuade them to 
keep silent.  Some are greater than others, but all are equally real and must be faced if 
whistleblowers are to be protected adequately. 
 
The first pressure is the one which perhaps receives the greatest publicity: the direct 
threat of violence if the individual concerned reports what they have discovered.  If the 
illicit activities are those of a criminal, or indeed terrorist, organisation, it can make it 
very clear that it expects knowledge of its activities to be kept within the circle and that 
anyone who speaks out will be killed or at least seriously injured.  On some occasions, 
the threat does not need to be spelled out: the reputation of the organisation is enough.  
The pressure is even greater where the violence may be carried out not only on the 
potential whistleblower himself but also on his family. 
 
It is clear that such threats and fears need to be taken extremely seriously.  Quite apart 
from the fact that they can dissuade people from blowing the whistle in the first place, 
they are equally effective in silencing witnesses who have come forward.  A dead 
witness, after all, is extraordinarily reticent – and it is ultimately in court that the 
testimony will be most effective.  Even if the whistleblower is merely injured, he will 
certainly take this as a warning: retract or worse will follow.  As just mentioned, a 
photograph or even mere reference to a member of his close family is also likely to 
achieve the desired result: in many cases, no further action need be taken for the 
witnesses to become remarkably forgetful. 
 
It should not be thought that this problem can be solved merely by arresting the suspect 
before he has a chance to threaten witnesses: action can often be carried out even from 
behind bars.  One example will suffice: a prison officer in Northern Ireland received a 
threat at his home, itself located some 100 km from the prison, less than 24 hours after an 
argument with an IRA prisoner. 
 
What is required in such cases is an adequate witness protection programme.  A system 
must exist – ie. be set up if it is not already in place – whereby the potential witness can 
be assured that he can disappear completely after he has given his evidence.  This will 
involve giving him – and his family – a completely new identity and setting them up in a 
new location, at a considerable distance from his previous activities, home and 
connections.  As far as the witness’ previous life is concerned, he must quite simply cease 
to exist, he must disappear into thin air.  The moment that the person against whom he 
testified, or indeed their associates, discover his new whereabouts, he in just as much 
danger as he was before.  Insofar as it is possible, therefore, this must not be permitted to 
happen. 
 
A country such as Nigeria has characteristics that simplify this, as well as others which 
make it more difficult.  One major advantage that Nigeria has over the United Kingdom, 
for example, is its size.  Abuja and Lagos are situated several hundred kilometres apart, 
yet this is only half-way across the country.  Within such a large country, there are a 
number of large cities: new locations can therefore be more easily found than, for 
example, in the Netherlands or even the U.K. 
 
Large though Nigeria is by European standards, it is nonetheless relatively small 
compared to two of the countries most successful in relocating witnesses: the United 
States and Canada.  It is not unheard of for the FBI to relocate a New York witness to a 
rural village in the Rocky Mountains; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have 
organised relocation programmes over even greater distances, from Toronto to the Yukon 
Territory.  It is therefore more foreseeable that, where a witness is relocated within 
Nigeria, they could be found.  This is exacerbated by Nigeria’s cultural diversity: it is nor 
for nothing that Abuja is described as the “Centre of Unity”.  A Yoruba from Lagos will 
be conspicuous in Hausaland, nor may he be particularly comfortable, given the strains 
that arise from time to time between the two.  Similarly, a Christian from Port Harcourt 
may not fit in particularly well in Kaduna or Katsina. 
 
These are not, however, insuperable problems: international co-operation can be of vital 
assistance here.  The United Kingdom is much smaller than Nigeria; its law enforcement 
agencies have therefore, when necessary, entered into arrangements with their 
counterparts in Australia and Canada: a witness from Liverpool will not be so easily 
found in a small town in rural New South Wales or central Alberta.  Nigeria can enter 
into similar arrangements; given the prominence that is given in many countries to the 
problems of Nigerian frauds, for example, the law enforcement agencies of several 
countries, in Europe and elsewhere would be likely to be very amenable to an approach 
for help.  There is the problem of the large and widespread Nigerian diaspora abroad: it is 
a risk that a cousin of the person against whom the witness has testified may happen to be 
located in the area of relocation.  But with care, even problems such as this may be 
overcome. 
 
It is important that a witness protection programme not be seen as a panacea: it is not.  It 
has its difficulties.  Firstly, it is very expensive.  The state, in particular the law 
enforcement agency, must fund a complete change of identity.  They will need to buy the 
witness a house in his new area, or at the very least fund the rent for a while.  They will 
need to provide travel expenses and arrange for the removal of at least some of the 
witness’ property.  This is not merely a courtesy to the witness (although the witness will 
expect such courtesies if he is to be persuaded to co-operate); it is necessary to the very 
credibility of the relocation.  The story will need to be that much better if it is to cover not 
only why the person has arrived in his new location out of the blue but also why he has 
arrived there with virtually no property to his name. 
 
Secondly, the risk can never be discounted that the relocated witness will do something 
that jeopardises his new identity.  It is remarkably common for persons under a witness 
protection programme to return for a visit to their old haunts for no other reason than that 
they are homesick and miss their friends.  Worse still, it has been known in the U.K., for 
example, for a former terrorist, with a new identity in a new location under, to attempt to 
impress people in the pub by telling them, “I used to be a hard man in Belfast.”  Stupid, 
yes, but it happens.  Nor is it mere bravado: the feeling of isolation and disorientation of 
many relocated witnesses is a genuine problem.  In principle, of course, if the witness 
themselves compromises their new identity, that is their problem: it is not then up to law 
enforcement to provide them with a second new identity and new location.  In practice, 
however, such assistance will be granted.  This is not only because there a general feeling 
that law enforcement agencies should do what they can for those who have risked their 
lives giving evidence, right though this sentiment is.  Every relocated witness who is 
identified and harmed renders the scheme less credible to the next potential witness and 
hence makes it less likely that they will come forward.  There is a very definite practical 
reason, not just not a moral one, to continue to give assistance.  Witness protection 
programmes are far from problem-free, but they are an essential tool in the fight against 
organised crime. 
 
Although physical threats are the most direct type of pressure, they are far from the only 
form.  Where the crime is being committed by an individual inside a legitimate 
institution, that person, if he or she suspects discovery, is very unlikely to react to a risk 
of being revealed by threatening violence.  In many institutions, particularly in some 
countries, it simply would not work: it would provoke the potential whistleblower into 
going straight to law enforcement.  Far from ensuring silence, it could well trigger the 
reverse.  Other types of pressure need therefore to be found. 
 
Of these, an important one is the threat to the whistleblower’s employment.  A member 
of staff who discovers wrongdoing in their institution may well be reluctant to speak out 
for fear of losing their job.  This is particularly so where the criminal is in a more senior 
position.  If there is a formal investigation, it may well come down to a question of one 
person’s word against the other’s.  Who will be believed: a senior and well-respected 
executive or a secretary?  Before that, the criminal may well take action to remove the 
colleague who threatens him.  It may start with a remark to management that “George 
doesn’t really seem to be fitting in”, although if he is more confident, he may call the 
whistleblower’s bluff by himself making a complaint: “Jane has recently been making the 
most unpleasant allegations about me and I really am not prepared to tolerate them any 
longer.”  In the 21st century, harassment claims need not be confined to the sexual sphere.  
Another option, again common in the 21st century, is that of redundancy.  Few, if any, 
managers or boards of directors react with indifference to proposals put forward to save 
the institution money: a suggestion that a given department be “downsized” often falls on 
receptive ears. 
 
This latter threat is all the more effective when it is likely that there will be redundancies 
in any event, the only question being whose job it will be that will go.  As with physical 
threats, the pressure may not be directly and explicitly applied: it is quite sufficient if the 
potential whistleblower is aware without being told that job cuts are in the air and fears 
that theirs will be one of them if they “rock the boat”. 
 
To combat this, there need to be specific employment protection measures relating to 
whistleblowers.  In the United Kingdom, these were introduced comparatively recently, 
under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.  This inserted into the Employment Rights 
Act 1996 a number of provisions protecting workers who make “protected disclosures”.  
These are in turn defined as “qualifying disclosures”.  It is useful first to consider what 
constitutes such a disclosure. 
 
Under section 43B of the 1996 Act, inserted by section 1 of the 1998 Act, a “qualifying 
disclosure is any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker 
making it, tends to show one (or more) of a number things.  The first two are specifically 
linked to economic crime: that a criminal offence has been committed, is being 
committed or is likely to be committed or that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to 
fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject.2  The first of these will 
clearly cover cases of fraud, money laundering, insider dealing and market manipulation, 
since these are criminal offences, but the second is also significant: it will cover, for 
example, failure to make proper and timely disclosures to the stock exchange or the 
Financial Services Authority or market abuse, the civil counterpart of insider dealing and 
market manipulation introduced under Part VIII of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000.  It will also, of course, cover things which, although not criminal or even 
regulatory offences, are nonetheless breaches of an officer’s duty to the company: 
contractual obligations are legal ones. 
 
The other categories are less directly linked to economic crime, but they are perhaps 
worth mentioning in passing: that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, the health or 
safety of any individual has been endangered or that the environment has been damaged.3  
These highlight the importance of the health and safety and the environmental protection 
laws in place in the U.K.  As with the previous two, a qualifying disclosure may also be 
made where the situation is either currently ongoing or is likely to arise in the future. A 
fifth and final circumstance is that information tending to show any matter falling within 
any one of these (and other) categories has been or is likely to be concealed.4   
 
It will immediately be noted that, for a disclosure to be protected, it is not necessary to 
establish that its contents are actually true, merely that the worker reasonably believed 
them to be true.  This is essential if the protection is to be at all effective.  In many, 
probably the overwhelming majority of cases, the person in the position of whistleblower 
does not have absolute, cast-iron proof of an offence, but is nonetheless sure that 
                                                 
2 Section 43B(1)(a) and (b). 
3 Subsections (c), (d) and (e). 
4 Subsection (f). 
something is amiss and has good reason for believing so.  In the case considered above, 
Alan, at the time that he voiced his suspicions that Bill was engaging in fraud, could not 
actually have proven it.  There was, conceivably, an innocent explanation for Bill’s 
actions, albeit that they were highly suspicious.  The same will apply to the colleagues 
and secretaries in a financial institution who suspect that one of the officers is engaging 
in illicit behaviour: when they say, after the fraud, etc. has come to light, that they knew 
it was going on, what they generally mean is that they strongly suspected it.  If such 
persons, should they report their suspicions, will only be protected if they are proved to 
be correct, this will itself be a major incentive to remain quiet and do nothing.  What if 
they are wrong? 
 
Yet the provision is not a carte blanche for malicious gossip.  The worker must believe 
that the information which he discloses is true and, furthermore, this belief must be 
reasonable.  The purpose of the section is to provide protection for those whose 
professional instincts (or, quite possibly, common sense) tell them that a person is 
engaging in wrongdoing and who act on that by reporting their suspicions.  It may be 
compared to the protection given in the German Geldwäschegesetz (Money Laundering 
Act) to persons who report a suspicion of money laundering: they are protected provided 
that the making of the report is neither malicious nor grossly negligent. 
 
Having established to what a protected disclosure relates, the Act then goes on to deal 
with to whom it is to be made.  There is quite an exhaustive list of persons, only some of 
which are specifically relevant to economic crime.  Section 43C relates to disclosures 
made to the worker’s employer or, where he reasonably believes that the matter relates to 
the conduct of some other person or a matter for which a person other than this employer 
has responsibility, that other person.  The disclosure must be made in good faith, 
although one would suggest that, if the whistleblower reasonably believes that the 
information he discloses tends to show one of the matters set out in section 43B, it will by 
definition be made in good faith.  Section 43F deals with disclosures to prescribed 
persons, ie. persons prescribed by a statutory instrument to receive such disclosures: for 
this to apply, the whistleblower must reasonably believe firstly that the matter falls within 
the remit of the person to whom he reports and secondly that the contents of the 
disclosure are true.   
 
Finally, there is provision, in section 43G, for disclosures made to other persons.  This 
has the greatest number of conditions attached to it.  Firstly, as under the previous 
sections, the disclosure must be made in good faith and, linked to this, the whistleblower 
must believe that information disclosed and the allegations it entails are true.  But 
secondly, it is required that the disclosure may not be made for the purposes of personal 
gain.  This does not mean that the whistleblower is disqualified from receiving any 
reward payable under a legal provision for the disclosure: section 43L(2) makes this 
clear.  But it does mean that the whistleblower’s own gain must not be the motive for the 
disclosure.  The Act does not specify what is meant by personal gain, but it could be 
argued to include not only money but also a personal advantage in the workplace: an 
example might be where both the whistleblower and the person against whom he makes 
the disclosure are both seeking a promotion to the same position.  Thirdly, the disclosure 
to the person in question must be reasonable “in all the circumstances of the case”. 
 
Further conditions are, however, laid down in section 43G(2), although only one of them 
need be satisfied.  These are, firstly, that the person believes that, if he were to make the 
disclosure to his employer, instead of the person to whom he does make it, he would 
suffer detriment.  “Detriment” essentially means that he would be dismissed, made 
redundant or suffer constructive dismissal.5  Alternatively, there may be no person 
prescribed for the purposes of a prescribed disclosure and, furthermore, the whistleblower 
may believe that, if he does make a disclosure to his employer, evidence of the 
wrongdoing will be concealed or destroyed.  Finally, he may make a disclosure to another 
person if he has already made a disclosure of substantially the same information either to 
his employer or to a prescribed person.  Although the Act does not say so, the inference is 
that this remedy is open to the whistleblower if he has already tried to make a disclosure 
through the normal channels but nothing has resulted from it.  This can and does happen 
where the person’s employer hears the disclosure but does not believe it, a problem 
discussed below. 
 
The establishment that a person has made a qualified, ie. protected, disclosure has the 
result that it is then unlawful for his employer to cause him to suffer detriment, either by 
acting or by failing to act.  The whistleblower may not, therefore, be left to suffer abuse 
at the hands of his colleagues while his employer merely looks on.  Nor may he simply be 
dismissed.  The importance of this is underlined by the fact that the Act specifically 
makes exceptions to the normal rules governing unfair dismissal.  In general terms, a 
person who has been employed for a period less than 12 months is not entitled to bring an 
action for unfair dismissal should he be dismissed.  Since he will generally have a 
contract of employment, he may bring an action for breach of contract, but the general 
remedies of employment, as opposed to contract, law are not available.  This is not the 
case, however, where the employee argues that the reason for his dismissal is that he 
made a protected disclosure. 
 
Just as he may bring an action for unfair dismissal should his employer fire him, he may 
also do so if his employer forces him out by more subtle means.  It may happen that the 
employer will want him to leave the company or institution but hopes to persuade him to 
resign.  One way he may do this is by altering the employee’s conditions of employment 
such as to make his position unsatisfactory at best and actually untenable at worst.  Faced 
with this intolerable situation, the employee then leaves and the employer has achieved 
his end without actually dismissing him.  In the case of a person who has made a 
protected disclosure, this will certainly constitute action by the employer which causes 
him to suffer detriment and hence be unlawful under section 47B.  But in addition, the 
employee may bring an action for unfair dismissal under the general principle in English 
employment law of constructive dismissal.  This simply means that, although the 
employer did not actually dismiss him in the sense of serving him with a notice of the 
termination of his employment, he did engage in behaviour which amounted to the same 
                                                 
5 For the definition of constructive dismissal, see below. 
thing.  The whistleblower is protected from this, regardless of how short or long a time he 
had been employed, just as he is from being actively dismissed. 
 
Similarly, he is protected, at least in part, from redundancy.  Redundancy is of course a 
principle whereby a person’s employment is terminated simply on the grounds that the 
employer no longer has room for that particular position.  Frequently, redundancies are 
made as part of cost-cutting measures, although it is sometimes alleged instead that the 
employer is merely seeking to run his business more efficiently.  In either case, the 
popular buzzword is “downsizing”. 
 
Redundancies are often necessary; indeed, they are often seen as an unavoidable feature 
of the economy of the early 21st century.  It has, however, long been recognised that 
employers can use a redundancy programme, even if it is in itself necessary, to rid 
themselves of perceived troublemakers.  The company may need to shed 20 employees 
for entirely legitimate reasons; the question, however, is which 20 will it be that lose their 
jobs.  Here, too the Employment Rights Act 1996, as amended by the Protected 
Disclosures Act 1998, has a part to play.  Where a person who has made a protected 
disclosure is made redundant, rather simply being dismissed out of hand, he will still 
have a cause of action if the reason why the employer selected him, rather than others, for 
redundancy is the protected disclosure that he made. 
 
Threats to the whistleblower’s employment can and should therefore be catered for.  But 
there remains another legal pressure: the fear of action for breach of confidentiality.  This 
generally arises in relation to suspected wrongdoing not on the part of a colleague, but on 
the part of a client.  For entirely legitimate reasons, most, if not all, jurisdictions have 
legal provisions, requiring professional confidentiality on the part of financial services 
professionals (and indeed some other professionals).  In the U.K., these provisions are 
generally civil in nature, in some cases (such as lawyers), supplemented by professional 
conduct rules.  Only in very few exceptions are there criminal sanctions and none of these 
relate to the financial services sector.6  In a number of other European countries, 
however, it is normal for criminal sanctions to be provided for general breaches of 
professional confidentiality.  In some, such as Switzerland and Luxembourg, such 
breaches carry a mandatory prison sentence.  It is therefore of the greatest importance 
that a report of suspected money laundering, which is not only encouraged but now 
actually required by law in many jurisdictions, must carry a safeguard that the person 
making it will not as a result be faced with legal penalties for breach of confidentiality.  
This a number of international instruments, including the EU Money Laundering 
Directive, now require and such safeguards it is therefore a widespread provision that a 
person who reports knowledge or suspicion of money laundering may not, in 
consequence, be liable for breach of confidentiality.  The relevant provision in the U.K. is 
section 337 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
 
This is well and good, but there are a number of ancillary risks, including defamation, 
should the report be found to have been made in good faith but nonetheless actually 
wrong, actions of loss of profits, in the same circumstances, or actions under the doctrine 
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of constructive trust should the relevant law enforcement agency ask the financial 
institution to proceed with a requested transaction.  For this reason, many jurisdictions, 
including, in Europe, France and Germany as well as the traditional bastions of secrecy in 
the financial services sector, namely Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg, have a 
much wider provision: a report of a suspicion of money laundering, made in compliance 
with the legislative requirements, may not result in any criminal or civil penalties being 
imposed on the person who made it.  The reference is not specifically to penalties for 
breach of confidentiality, as in the U.K., it is to any resulting penalties, criminal or civil.  
As seen above, Germany requires, in order for the protection to apply, that the report 
must not have been made either maliciously or through gross negligence; France 
similarly imposes a requirement of good faith (which may be compared to the provisions 
in the U.K.’s Protected Disclosures Act).  But, provided that this is satisfied, the 
protection is rather more comprehensive than that which the U.K. provides. 
 
In conclusion, whistleblowers are indeed a vital tool in the fight against financial and 
economic crimes in their various forms.  There are, however, several pressures which can 
act powerfully to dissuade a potential whistleblower from speaking out.  These must be 
identified and adequately dealt with in relevant legislation.  The life of the whistleblower 
will never be an ideal one – this we cannot provide – but it is possible to provide a 
number of basic protections. 
 
 
